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A CRAIGIAN THEODICY OF HELL
Charles Seymour

Problem: if God has middle knowledge, he should actualize a world containing only persons whom he knows would freely choose heaven. Thus
there should be no hell. Craig offers an answer to this problem in his article
" 'No Other Name': a Middle Knowledge Perspective on the Exclusivity of
Salvation Through Christ." Craig is mainly concerned to give a logically
possible defense of hell, though he thinks his suggestion does not lack the
sort of plausibility needed for a theodicy. I consider various objections to the
latter assessment. My conclusion is that, although Craig's argument is
implausible as a theodicy of conservative exclusivist soteriology, it is useful
for less traditional ideas of hell.

One problem with the doctrine of hell is that it seems possible for God,
being omniscient, to know via middle knowledge those worlds which,
were he to actualize them, would contain only persons freely accepting salvation. If God is omnipotent it should be possible for him to actualize such
a world, and he would prefer to do so if he is perfectly good. Thus God
would not create a world in which some persons reject salvation. Call this
suggestion "the argument from middle knowledge."
In his article" 'No Other Name': a Middle Knowledge Perspective on
the Exclusivity of Salvation Through Christ," William Lane Craig attempts
to solve this problem by arguing that there might be no worlds feasible for
God in which all people are saved. Even if there are, they may be seriously
deficient in other ways, so that God, while remaining perfectly good,
would prefer to create some other world in which there are persons who
choose damnation. Craig's response, to use the common parlance, is a
defense of hell rather than a theodicy of hell. That is to say, Craig is concerned merely to demonstrate the compossibility of God's existence and
the existence of the damned; as is the case with Plantinga in the Free Will
Defense, Craig is committed only to the claim that his solution is logically
possible, whether or not it is epistemically implausible.
In the face of any variety of the problem of evil, including the problem
of hell, I find it hard to feel any interest in a mere defense. It is small comfort to realize that there is some logically possible explanation of why God
allows evil if we believe that this explanation is in fact false. To take the
Free Will Defense as an example, why should the mere possibility that natural disasters are instigated by demons help justify the ways of God to
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man if we believe that demons do not have or exercise this power? Of
course Plantinga says that he sees nothing unlikely in the possibility of
malevolent spirits wreaking havoc in the world, but what this claim
amounts to is that the Free Will Defense can be turned into a Free Will
Theodicy. Craig, for his part, makes a similar move, saying that although
his response is presented only as a logically possible defense of hell, it is
also not implausible. It follows that we should be able to develop a
Craigian theodicy of hell which appeals only to premises not believed to be
false or improbable. The purpose of this paper is to attempt such a theodicy by defending Craig's argument against the charge of implausibility.

Craig's Defense of Hell
Craig is defending, not just the generic possibility of damnation, but a
particular view of hell in which those who do not accept Christ are lost.
Craig believes that "Those who make a well-informed and free decision to
reject Christ are self-condemned, since they repudiate God's unique sacrifice for sin."l This is so because faith in Jesus is "the one means of salvation
which God has provided."2 However, the problem arises of people who
have never heard of Christianity. It might seem unfair or mean-spirited to
damn people for not accepting a doctrine they have never heard of. Craig
admits that some who have not heard the gospel might be saved by
responding to "the light of general revelation" that all people possess. But
this possibility is remote, for "the testimony of Scripture is that the mass of
humanity do not even respond to the light that they do have."3 How can a
loving God condemn those who sin against the light yet have not heard of
the means of salvation? Craig's solution to this particular problem sheds
some light on the argument from middle knowledge.
Granting that God has middle knowledge, among the cmmterfactuals of creaturely freedom that God knows are truths about what various
people would freely do when confronted with the Christian message, for
instance: "If Chuang Tzu had heard the gospel, he would have freely
accepted Christ." Craig solves the problem of those who have never heard
of Christ by supposing that they all would have rejected Christ had they
heard of him. More exactly, for any person A who dies without hearing of
Christ, there are no circumstances C such that "If C were the case, then A
would have freely accepted Christ." No matter how appealingly the
gospel were presented to her, she would reject it. These souls exhibit what
Craig calls "transworld damnation, which is possessed by any person who
freely does not respond to God's grace and so is lost in every world feasible for God in which that person exists."" Craig's contention is that God is
neither unjust or cruel in condemning people to hell who have not heard of
Jesus, if they would have rejected Jesus had they heard the gospel.
Why does God create such people? Why does he not create only
people who freely accept Jesus? This question is at the heart of the argument from middle knowledge. Craig answers that if God were to refrain
from creating all those who are damned in our world, then circumstances
would have been very different, which means that some of those who
accepted Jesus in our world might then reject him. Let C be the total set of
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circumstances of our world, a world in which there are some who accept
Christ and some who reject him. The argument from middle knowledge
proposes that God could have refrained from creating all those souls who
reject Jesus in C. But this would mean that a different world would have
existed, whose total set of circumstances we can call C*. Now the argument assumes that all those who accepted Jesus in C would accept Jesus if
C* were the case. But, says Craig, this assumption is baseless. It is epistemically possible that in C* some who were Christians in C would not be.
Further, it may be that there is no total set of circumstances God could create in which everyone would freely accept the gospel. For all we know,
then, God faces the choice of either creating a world in which some are
damned, or not creating free beings at all. Surely, says Craig, God should
not refrain from creating a world simply because some souls would stubbornly refuse God's grace.
In summary, Craig argues that the counterfactuals of creaturely
freedom may be such that God cannot create a world in which everyone is
saved. It is not unloving, then, for God to create a world including people
he foresees choosing damnation, if doing so is necessary for creating a
world including people who choose salvation. This is particularly true if
we suppose, as is entirely possible, that those who choose damnation
would do so in any world in which they existed.
Everything Craig says is logically possible; and since he sees his
task as showing how it is possible that God's goodness and hell co-exist,
Craig can be satisfied with a logically possible response to the problem of
foreknowledge. But as was said in the introduction, my goal is to provide
a solution to the problem of hell which is not only possible but not implausible. Although it is not his primary concern, Craig feels his solution does
not lack plausibility.s Is he right?

First Objection
We will consider four objections. The first two concentrate on Craig's
claim that God might not be able to create a world containing only
Christians. A closer look at the nature of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom will reveal our first objection. Craig is right in supposing that different circumstances may result in different actions on the part of free beings.
But not all differences make a difference. First, the circumstances must be
in some way noticeably different to the person acting in order for them to
make a difference in the person's action. A person will act the same way in
circumstances which to him appear exactly identical.6
This fact alone does not tell against Craig. For the difference between a
world filled with those who accept Christ, and a world in which there are
many who do not, is a difference which is noticeable. But we must make a
further qualification, for not all noticeable differences make a difference in
action. I will notice if I have ten trees or eleven in my front yard; but the
difference will not influence my career decisions. For circumstances to
make a difference in my actions, they must affect the motives which influence me. We might think of a way in which the number of trees in my
yard would affect my career choices: perhaps the additional tree is placed
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in such a way that it adds greatly to the beauty of my home, making me
more willing to remain living in it, and thus more willing to remain at my
job. But there are clearly noticeable differences which are irrelevant to certain decisions. An additional tree which neither adds to nor detracts from
the attractiveness of my lawn, which neither adds to or subtracts from the
property value of my home, in short, which has no other effect than its
mere presence, is not going to influence my decision to seek a new job.
For Craig's argument to be more than merely possible, he must explain
how God's refraining from creating certain persons who reject Christ
makes a difference in other people's decision to accept Christ. Craig says
that if God were not to create those who reject Christ in this world, this
change in circumstances could lead to others rejecting Christ who accepted
him in this world. We must ask why this makes a difference.
Perhaps the damned function as examples for others to learn from.
Sadly, a negative example is the only stimulus strong enough to restrain
some people from self-destructive behavior. With respect to drug abuse,
for instance, some people find the idea of chemically induced ecstasy
inherently distasteful, degrading to rational beings, an obstacle to the more
lasting though less intense pleasures of love, work, or religion. In the eyes
of others, however, there is a glamorous appeal to drug abuse that will
only be dispelled by their witnessing first hand or through reliable testimony the desolation brought about by addiction.
The case of accepting Christ is less dramatic but essentially similar.
Some are attracted to Christianity because of its intrinsic worth: they are
drawn by the intellectual power of a Christian world-view, or the nobility
of Jesus as portrayed in the New Testament, for example. But there are
those who will only convert to Christ by comparing the lives of those who
accept Christ favorably to those who reject Christ, finding in the former a
love and peace which is generally lacking in the latter. In a more spectacular way, the massive evils inflicted by societies founded on the rejection of
Christ (the Third Reich, Soviet Russia, Mao's China) serve as signs hard to
ignore for even the habitually indifferent.
Of course not all non-Christians are unhappy or immoral, just as not all
drug users are addicts. For the above response to work, we need not
assume that all Christians are saints and all non-Christians are villains. But
we must at least assume that those who accept Christ have an advantage
over those who reject him. Is this assumption implausible? I do not think
so. In any event, it is part and parcel of Christian teaching: "By their fruits
you shall know them." If the claim is false, Christianity is false and we
need not bother justifying hell to begin with.
Even granting that Christianity gives its adherents a real advantage in
living a visibly better life, there is the problem of non-Christians who are to
all appearances saintly and so would not serve as negative examples
encouraging others to convert to Christ. Since Craig thinks all nonChristians are damned, then the above explanation would be in his view
incomplete. Perhaps Hitler or Stalin were created as object lessons, but
what about, say, Gandhi?
Less conservative readers will not take offense if I allow the possibility
that Gandhi is not damned. Certainly he rejected Christianity, but at some
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less conscious level he may not have rejected Christ. Craig will part company with me at this point, since he believes that explicit faith in Christ is
necessary for salvation. But as I will argue shortly, the fact of heathen
sanctity makes Craig's Christian exclusivity implausible. In defending a
broadly Craigian theodicy of hell, then, I do not intend to endorse all the
details of Craig's own position.
Another objection to my argument would point out that a permanent
rejection of Christ is not necessary for the sake of motivating conversions in
others; a merely temporary rejection of Christ can serve equally well.
Suppose that Hitler's atrocities lead Karl Stein to convert to Christianity in
1943. Presumably Stein's new-found faith would not be shaken if Hitler
converted in 1944; in fact, it would be confirmed. To take the analogy with
drug use farther, one need not be a permanent addict in order to show to
others the horrors of drug abuse. The visible improvement that results
from shaking an addiction is an additional inducement for others to avoid
drugs. Seeing Hitler convert and become a better person would be at least
as strong a motivation to conversion as seeing Hitler unrepentant, monstrous, and miserable to the end of his days. If negative examples are necessary for Stein to repent, then shouldn't God have created in place of
Hitler a person who would reject Christ until Stein accepts Christ, but who
would also accept Christ at a later timeT
Indeed God would prefer to create the merely temporary rebel if he
could. But given libertarian freedom, we have no assurance that this is feasible for God. For instance, there is no reason to suppose that there is
someone God could have created in the place of Hitler who would have
both (1) freely lived a life blatantly vicious enough to prompt Stein's conversion, and (2) freely accepted Christ at some time after Stein's conversion. It is possible-and, as required for theodicy, not obviously unlikely-that anyone fulfilling (1) would fail to meet (2).
There remains one problem. I admitted that some people accept Christ
for reasons that are internal to Christianity itself. C. S. Lewis, for instance,
found Christianity to be logically inescapable: his autobiography Surprised
by Joy portrays his conversion as a largely philosophical process. In The
Seven Storey Mountain Thomas Merton emphasizes the emotional and aesthetic appeals of Roman Catholicism which led him to convert. It is probable, it could be argued, that Lewis, Merton, and others like them would
have accepted Christ even in a world in which everyone else did, a world
in which there were no reprobates living notorious lives to highlight by
contrast the benefits of Christianity. It seems God should have populated
the world only with Christians like Lewis who, if not transworldly saved,
at least make a decision to convert which does not hinge on the existence of
the lost. If this is feasible, then God need not create the damned in order
to create some who are saved.
We need not wonder how a Craigian theodicy of hell would deal with
this argument; Craig has already given a response. As he puts it:
Suppose that the only worlds feasible for God in which all persons
receive Christ and are saved are worlds containing only a handful of
persons. Is it not at least possible that such a world is less preferable
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to God than a world in which great multitudes come to experience
His salvation and a few are damned because they freely reject Christ?
Not only does this seem to me possibly true, but I think that it probably is true. Why should the joy and blessedness of those who would
receive God's grace and love be prevented on account of those who
would freely spurn it?8
50 even if God could create a world in which there are only people who
accept Christ, God is justified in creating worlds with damned people, as
long as this is necessary for creating a much larger number of the saved.
Perhaps people like Lewis or Merton are rare. God should create more
people, some of whom damn themselves quite willingly, for the sake of
receiving many more people who will experience eternal joy.
In sum, then, Craig can answer our first objection by saying that the
existence of those who choose damnation does have an influence on other
persons' decision to accept salvation. Even if it were possible for God to
create only people who would accept Christ regardless of other people's
spiritual state, it is not implausible to suppose that the number of such people is so small as to make such a world much worse than a world in which
there are some damned but many saved.

Second Objection
The second objection, found in Thomas Talbott's response to Craig, is
also based on the belief that only noticeable differences can make a difference in action:' Craig had argued that a world in which the damned do not
exist is noticeably different than our world, and different in a way that is
relevant to the salvation of those who do accept Christ. Talbott accepts this
for the sake of argument. 5till, he continues, there is no noticeable difference, to any given person 5, between a world in fact peopled with the
saved and the damned, and a dream-world which appears to 5 exactly the
same way. As long as 5 is not aware of this fact, he cannot be affected by it.
Thus, Talbott concludes, God can make sure all are saved. If 5 for some
reason will only accept Christ in a world that contains non-Christians, then
God can create 5 as a brain-in-the-vat, programmed to receive impressions
of people who reject Christ.
This objection is stronger than the first, but it is not beyond reproach. In
his article "Talbott's Universalism Once More" Craig questions both the
logical validity and the ethical basis of Talbott's argument. I will defend
Talbott against the charge of invalidity, but I agree with Craig that ethical
considerations make Talbott's suggestion implausible.
To show its invalidity, Craig casts the argument in symbolic form and
shows how the premises do not imply the desired conclusion. It will be
easiest to simply reproduce Craig's discussion here.
Talbott argues that if in Cl 5 would be freely saved and in C2 5'
would be freely saved, then in C3 5 and 5' would be freely saved.
[C 3 is the circumstance of 5 and 5' obtaining the appearances of Cl
and C 2, respectively.] Let, then, C n = 'Circumstancesn obtain', Sn =
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'5n will freely accept salvation', and ACn = The appearance of C n
obtains'. In order to avoid the fallacy of strengthening the
antecedent, Talbott infers from

that

He justifies this inference by supposing that
(9) (AC1 • AC2) = C3.
We thus infer (8) from
(10) (AC I • AC2) ~ 51 • 52·
But how do we know that (10) is true? The answer is that to 51, Cl
and ACI are indistinguishable; similarly for 52 and C2 and AC2. 50
we may affirm
(11) (Cl ~ 51)::J (ACI ~ 51),

(12) (C2 ~ 52) ::J (AC2 ~ 52)·
From (6), (11) and (7), (12), it follows that
(13) (AC 1 ~ 51),
(14) (AC2 ~ 52).

But how do we move from (13), (14), to (1O)? The answer seems to
be: by strengthening the antecedent of (13) or (14), which is logically
invalid. Hence, the argument for (8) is unsound.lO
Problems of precision arise at the very outset. First, Craig uses the notation
5n equivocally; at one moment it refers to a person 5n , the next to the state
of affairs consisting in 5n 's accepting salvation. For the sake of accuracy,
then, I will let 5n refer to the state of affairs of a person accepting salvation,
and 5n will refer to persons themselves. Another ambiguity is that when
Craig lets ACn = "The appearance of Cn obtains", he does not stipulate to
whom the appearance obtains. Does ACI means that 5t, or 52, or everyone
experiences the appearance of Cl? Thus we need to be more precise. Let us
assume in the following that AnCn = "The appearance of Cn obtains to 5n . "
The crucial premises are (11) and (12). The principle underlying these
propositions is Talbott's claim that if two circumstances are indistinguishable to a person 5, then 5 will perform the same action in both circumstances. The problem with Craig's critique is that it underestimates the
force of this principle. When applied consistently, it in fact leads to the
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conclusion that Talbott wishes to draw.
Craig correctly notes that since Cl and AlCl are indistinguishable, (11)
is true. It is also true that (11), even when combined with its counterpart
(12), does not lead to (8). However, Cl and AlCl' and C2 and A2C2, are
not the only pairs of circumstances that are indistinguishable to SI or S2.
AlCl and the circumstance (AlCl • A2C2) are both indistinguishable to SI
as well as to S2. Because SI is "hermetically sealed in his own illusory
world"ll, as Craig puts it, he does not notice whether or not A2C2
obtains-that is to say, because 9 experiences only his own illusory world,
he does not know what S2 is experiencing. Likewise with respect to S2 and
AlCl. On the model of premises (11) and (12) above, we can derive from
these considerations the following premises.

These premises allow us to formulate a valid argument for Talbott's
conclusion.
by assumption
(2*) (Cl --7 Sl) ::::l (AlCl
guishable to 9
(3*) AIC1

--7

Sl

--7

Sl)

from (1), (2) by modus ponens

(4*) (AlCl --7 Sl)::::l [(AlCl • A2C2)
A2C2) are indistinguishable to Sl

--7

Sl] since AlCl and (AlCl •

In parallel fashion

by assumption
(7*) (C2 --7 S2) ::::l (A2C2
able to S'

--7

S2) since C2 and A2C2 are indistinguish-

(8*) A2C2 --7 S2 from (6*), (7*) by modus ponens

(9*) (A2C2 --7 S2)::::l [(AlCl • A2C2)
A2C2) are indistinguishable to S2

--7

S2] since A2C2 and (AlCl •

from (8*), (9*) by modus ponens
From (5*) and (10*), by a law of counterfactuallogic, we infer that
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Thus Talbott's argument is not invalid, and the first of Craig's responses
is nullified. But even if Talbott's logic is faultless, the value judgments on
which Talbott depends are suspect. As Descartes says, God is not a deceiver. The idea of hell may be intolerable, but it is just as intolerable to think
that all our friends, our loved ones, our possessions and accomplishments,
are purely illusory. Craig says, "This constitutes a profound violation of
human dignity."12 One could respond that temporary deception is preferable to eternal misery.J3 This may be true if God is conceived of as a utilitarian maximizer of happiness, but if God is one who instead respects individuals enough to let them make free choices in the face of reality, then
Craig's response is cogent. The issue also depends on how one conceives
of hell. The point is more acute to the extent that hell approximates a sort
of eternal torture. But milder views are possible in which hell is, though an
existence of unending unhappiness, not excruciatingly painful to the
damned. We can even conceive of the damned preferring it to the humility
involved in submitting to God. So it is not apparent that deceit is better
than eternal suffering.

Third Objection
So far we have limited our discussion to Craig's premise that God may
not be able to create a world with only the saved. For our third objection,
let us turn to a different premise; namely, the claim that all those who have
not heard of Christ suffer from transworld damnation. Consider Mohandas
Gandhi. Just as Hitler has become the archetype of evil for the twentiethcentury, so Gandhi is our stock example of the virtuous man. Gandhi had
heard of Christianity but rejected it. It is very probable, however, that if he
had been born in different circumstances, he would have been a Christian.
Gandhi exhibited a love of truth and a willingness to follow it that makes it
likely he would have accepted Christianity if, say, he had understood it better (he seems to have gotten his impression of Christianity from some lukewarm missionaries), or had been born in England rather than India, or had
been born into a meat-eating family (his vegetarianism led him to rank
Jesus below Buddha).14 Gandhi's rejection of Christianity seems to have
been based on innocent error and unavoidable cultural influences, not
rebellion against God or worldliness. Thus it is likely that, for Gandhi, there
are circumstances in which he would have accepted Christ.
Gandhi does not fit Craig's argument exactly, since Craig was discussing those who had never heard of Christianity. However, the case of
Gandhi suggests that not all who reject Christ suffer from transworld
damnation. Thus Craig's solution cannot be total; he cannot justify God's
damning people like Gandhi. Furthermore, for every good person like
Gandhi who has heard the gospel and rejected it, there are likely to be
other equally good people who have not heard the gospel at all. Craig
does not discuss the case of pre-Christian figures like Socrates or Buddha
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who seem to have been men of good will; given different circumstances,
they most likely would have accepted Christ. It also seems likely that in
those nations largely untouched by the gospel, say medieval India or present-day China, there would be many good people who would have been
Christians had things been different. It's hard to believe that none of them
would have accepted Christ had they been raised in pious Christian
homes, for example. In SUill, good people would likely accept God's truth,
given the ability to hear it, the mind to discern the truth and/ or a clear revelation from God.
Craig might hold that such people as Gandhi and Socrates are instances
of those rare individuals who respond to "the light of general revelation"
and so obtain the benefits of Christ's atoning death without being
Christian. Unfortunately Craig does not explain what is involved in
responding to the light of general revelation. Gandhi confesses to various
moral failings in his autobiography, so it seems that he did not always act
in accordance with his beliefs. Perhaps by "responding to the light of general revelation" Craig means "obeying one's conscience most of the time."
One might wonder then what percentage of good actions is required to
qualify as an adequate response to the light, and why someone who falls
just above this percentage is saved and obtains eternal happiness, whereas
those who fall below it experience everlasting unhappiness.
The case of Gandhi and people like him makes it unlikely that all who
reject Christianity until death exhibit transworld damnation. Still, if one
allows that good people can be saved without accepting Jesus, or that people are given chances after death to accept Christ in more conducive circumstances, then the concept of transworld damnation remains helpfuL
After all, the fact that there are some non-Christians such as Gandhi who
do not exhibit transworld damnation does not prove that there are no nonChristians who exhibit it. It could be that all those who are damned are
transworldly damned, even if not all those who reject Christ (at least in this
life) are damned.
Still, the definition of transworld damnation needs a bit of fine tuning
before it can drive a theodicy of hell. Most Christians believe that infants
can be saved despite the fact that they are obviously incapable of choosing
Christ. But infant salvation presents a severe problem for the claim that all
the damned are transworldly damned. Clearly Hitler, if damned, is not
transworldy damned, since God could have given him a fatal case of
measles immediately after his baptism. If infants need not be baptized in
order to be saved, then so much the better; God need not wait for someone
to baptize Hitler before giving him the measles.
Craig invites such problems by defining transworld damnation as the
property "which is possessed by any person who freely does not respond to
God's grace and so is lost in every world feasible for God in which that
person exists." ls Clearly, on a conservative evangelical view which restricts
free choice with respect to salvation to our antemortem existence, no one is
likely to be transworldly damned; for each person there is a world feasible
for God in which that person dies before the "age of accountability" and
hence does not freely fail to respond to God's grace. Similar problems face
liberal views which allow for the possibility of salvation after death. Yet
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Craig could not drop the word "freely" from the definition of transworld
damnation without creating other difficulties. On the catholic view, baptized infants do not respond to God's grace, yet they are saved; and few
evangelicals would say that infants go to hell because they did not accept
Jesus as their savior.
Craig's transworld damnation is modelled after Plantinga's "transworld
depravity", which is the property a person has if he would commit a sin in
any circumstances in which he was created. More accurately, the person
exhibits transworld depravity if and only if he would commit a sin in any
circumstances in which he was created free. To make his property of
transworld damnation a more precise application of Plantingian theodicy
to the question of hell, Craig needs to define transworld damnation as the
property which is possessed by any person who freely does not respond to
God's grace, and so is lost, in every world feasible for God in which that
person exists free to respond to God's grace or not. By adding this clause,
Craig could allow that there are worlds in which the transworldly damned
do not freely fail to respond to God. These worlds, however, are worlds in
which the damned are not free to respond at all, because of infancy, mental
disease or defect, etc., and so are not counterexamples to his definition of
transworld damnation.
I believe this revision to be Craig's original intent. First, it is closer to
Plantinga's definition of transworld depravity, and Craig says that
transworld damnation is analogous to transworld depravity.16 Second,
Craig developed the notion of transworld damnation in response to those
who would say that God would not create somebody who chooses damnation if he could create him in circumstances in which he freely chooses salvation. The revised definition of transworld damnation, by asserting that
there are no feasible worlds in which the damned freely choose salvation,
is more appropriate to this task.
What if a proponent of the argument from middle knowledge maintained that damnation is such a horrible fate that God would do anything
feasible in order to prevent someone from experiencing it, even if this
requires bringing about their death as infants? The problem is that such a
response places a lower value on free choice than most theodicists are
wont to do. The problem of hell, like the problem of evil in general, is best
solved by appealing to free will. Freedom is valuable enough to outweigh
the evils it sometimes brings about, and this includes the evil of damnation. Of course, depending on our theological views on the fate of dead
infants and children, we might have to admit that God creates some people
who are never given a free choice for or against salvation. But recognizing
the value of free will allows us to say that it is not necessary that God create us in worlds in which we are saved, if the only worlds in which we are
saved are ones in which we never develop free choice. Putting it loosely,
the damned would have nothing to complain of in being damned since
they would not have freely chosen salvation in any world in which that
choice was given them.
We are still confronted with the example of Gandhi and others who are
not likely to be transworldly damned even on the revised definition. It is
very likely that in some feasible world in which Gandhi is free to decide, he

Faith and Philosophy

114

accepts Christ. So even the revised formulation of transworld damnation
cannot help us formulate a theodicy of conservative versions of hell. But
liberal views of hell will not insist on Gandhi being damned, as they could
admit the likelihood of Gandhi accepting Christ in the afterlife. All a
Craigian liberal need say is that anyone who freely refuses salvation even
after death would not accept salvation in any world in which he was created free to choose salvation. Since we can't see what people choose after
death, such a claim is not (in this life) open to refutation.
In sum, it is unlikely that all non-Christians are transworldly damned,
and so it is difficult to defend Craig's variety of conservative evangelical
soteriology. However, his notion of transworld damnation remains helpful in defending liberal versions of hell. On these versions it is not implausible to suppose that the damned choose damnation in every world in
which they are created free to choose. It is not cruel for God to let these
people be damned.

Fourth Objection
But is it morally acceptable that they be created in the first place? This
question underlies the fourth and final objection to Craig. Suppose that
Craig is right and God can create people who choose heaven only by creating other people who choose hell. Would it not be cruel of God to do so?
According to Marilyn Adams' definition, "God is good" means God
ensures that every person's life is on the whole a great good. 17 The lives of
the damned are not on the whole good; indeed, every moment of their
postmortem existence is on the whole bad. Thus God cannot create anyone who is damned, even if this means God cannot create any free beings
in heaven either.
Craig is rightly skeptical about the moral principle appealed to here. He
asks, "Why should the joy and blessedness of those who would receive
God's grace and love be prevented on acount of those who would freely
spurn it?"l' Later he says that the "previsioned obduracy [of the damned]
should not be allowed to preclude God's creating persons who would freely
respond to His grace and be saved."19 It would be tragic for the freely chosen rebellion of some souls to prevent the creation of other souls who will
accept everlasting happiness; as C. S. Lewis puts it in The Great Divorce, we
would not want a world in which "misery can hold joy up for ransom."20

Conclusion
So the problem of middle knowledge is defused. It is epistemically possible, as Craig says, that no matter what situation God created, some
would refuse him; and it is not unloving, indeed it shows a love and
respect for the autonomy of the person, for God to create some who damn
themselves in any and all situations in which they are given the choice, if
this is necessary for others to attain salvation.
There are other arguments against the doctrine of hell besides the one
from middle knowledge. There is the problem of the apparent injustice of
inflicting eternal punishment for finite Stl.s, the question of whether the
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blessed in heaven, and God himself, can be happy given the existence of
the darrmed, etc. So in defending Craig's response to the argument from
middle knowledge I have not developed a complete theodicy of hell.
Indeed, I doubt that Craig's article will be helpful in answering these other
arguments-nor was it intended to be. But as he gives us the most effective response to the argument from middle knowledge to date, any finished theodicy of hell will be to that extent Craigian. 2J
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